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This paper presents three variants of a tractable structural model in
which default may take place both expectedly and unexpectedly. The
model has the merit of predicting realistically high short term credit
spreads. Closed form solutions are provided for corporate bonds (and
default swaps) when interest rates are constant or stochastic and when
the bond recovery value is exogenous or endogenous to the model. The
analysis suggests that, in order for the observed short term yield spreads
on high grade corporate bonds to be compensation for credit risk, bond
holders must believe that a dramatic sudden plunge in the ﬁrm’s assets
value is possible, even if extremely unlikely.
Key words: corporate bond valuation, structural model, unexpected de-
fault, short term credit spreads, endogenous bond recovery value, plunge
1of assets value.
JEL classiﬁcation: G13;G33.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This work presents closed form solutions for pricing corporate bonds and credit
default swaps using a structural model approach. Following Cathcart and El-
Jahel (2003), the speciﬁcity of the model is that default can occur in two diﬀerent
ways, i.e. either when the value of the ﬁrm’s assets ﬁrst drops to the level of the
default barrier, or when an unexpected sudden event causes the ﬁrm to default.
Within this framework closed form solutions are presented whereby the recovery
value of the bond upon default is either exogenous or endogenous to the model.
Under exogenous bond recovery value, the default free term structure can be
ﬂat and constant or it can be stochastic.
When the default free term structure is ﬂat and constant, the exogenous
bond recovery value is assumed to be a fraction of its face value. When the
default free short rate is stochastic, the exogenous recovery value of the bond is
assumed to be a fraction of its default free value, which is a typical assumption
in the presence of a stochastic default free term structure (see e.g. Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz, 1995). This is a special case of the model by Cathcart and El-
Jahel (2003), for which a new closed form solution is presented. Under a ﬂat and
constant term structure, the endogenous recovery value of the bond is a function
of the value of the debtor’s assets at the time of default. All these model variants
can provide a solution to a well know shortcoming of the "traditional" structural
2models of credit risk, in that they are capable to predict realistically high short
term credit spreads.
The analysis with endogenous debt recovery value suggests that, if the ob-
served short term yield spreads for high grade borrowers are compensation for
credit risk, bond holders must believe there is a tiny probability (e.g. less than
1% per annum) of a dramatic sudden drop in assets value, a drop which can
plunge assets value down to approximately the level of the default barrier.
1.1 Literature
In the last decade structural models and reduced form models of credit risk have
been "competing" to price default risky corporate bonds. Structural models
have the advantage of making eﬀective use of balance sheet and equity price
information in a theoretically coherent way, but have been unable to generate
realistically high short term credit spreads. Reduced form models have been
able to generate realistically high short term credit spreads, but do not make
full use of ﬁrm speciﬁc information or are based on rating information which is
usually not timely or exhaustive.
The under-prediction of short term credi ts p r e a d sb ys t r u c t u r a lm o d e l si sa t
least partly due to the fact that empirically observed yield spreads on corporate
bonds incorporate a liquidity premium over and above a credit risk premium (see
e.g. Perraudin 2003). Moreover, such yield spreads may also partly be due to
the often less favorable tax treatment of corporate bond coupons with respect to
government bond coupons. Nether-the-less short term credit spreads predicted
3by structural models still look disturbingly lower than observed corporate yield
spreads.
Recent literature on credit risk valuation, aware of the respective advantages
and disadvantages of structural models and reduced form models, has repeatedly
tried to reconcile the structural and the reduced form approaches in order to
achieve some sort of advantageous synthesis of two. Notable such examples
are Duﬃe and Lando (2001), who show how credit spreads are aﬀected by the
often incomplete accounting information available to bond holders, and Zhou
(2001), who assumes that the value of the ﬁrm’s assets follows a jump diﬀusion
process and values bonds through simulation. These two models are capable
of predicting higher short term credit spreads than implied by usual structural
models at the expense of model tractability. Alternatively, the best practice,
e.g. Pan (2001), has assumed a stochastic default barrier capable to predict
non-negligible short term credit spreads on corporate bonds. Pan’s model as
well as Duﬃe and Lando’s have the drawback of predicting excessively high
short term spreads when default is likely and the bond is close to maturity.
This paper is more close in spirit to Cathcart and El-Jahel’s (2003) in that
both expected and unexpected default can take place. But, unlike in Cathcart
and El-Jahel, full closed form solutions are derived when the default hazard
rate is constant, when the default free interest rate is constant or stochastic and
when the recovery value of the defaulted bond is endogenous.
Hereafter, section 2 proposes new closed form solutions for bond and default
swap values under constant and stochastic interest rates given that the recovery
4value of the defaulted bond is exogenous. Section 3 proposes a closed form solu-
tion for bond value under constant interest rates whereby the recovery value of
the defaulted bond depends on the ﬁrm’s assets value at the time of unexpected
default.
2 The bond valuation model with exogenous debt
recovery value
The bond valuation model assumptions are standard. The model assumes uni-
versal risk neutrality. The ﬁrm’s assets value risk neutral process follows a
geometric Brownian motion
dV =( r − b) · V · dt + s · V · dz (1)
where r is the default free short interest rate assumed constant over time, where
b is the assets pay-out ratio, where s is the assets volatility parameter, where dz
is the diﬀerential of a Wiener process; b and s are are constant. The ﬁrm has
issued a bond security with value of D(V,t), with face value of P, with maturity
of T and yearly coupon ﬂow (assumed to be continuously paid) of C.D e f a u l t
can occur in an expected way the ﬁrst time V drops to the level Vb. Thereupon
the recovery value of D(V,t),d e n o t e db yR, is an exogenous fraction α of the
bond face value P, i.e. R = αP with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Default can occur also in an unexpected way in any inﬁnitesimal time period
5dt.I na n yp e r i o ddt there is a probability λdt that default may be unexpectedly
precipitated causing D(V,t) to fall to the constant recovery value Rλ = α1P,
where again 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1.T h u sR need not equal Rλ. Note that in this section
the bond recovery value upon default is an exogenous fraction of the par value
of the bond. Diﬀerent recovery assumptions will be made later in the paper.
The event that triggers unexpected default is a completely unexpected event
that is independent of the market value of the ﬁrm’s assets V ,s u c ha sm a yb et h e
discovery of substantial misgivings in the ﬁrm’s accounts. Employing standard
valuation arguments, we know that the value D(V,t) of the corporate bond
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Equation 2 reﬂects the facts that a continuous coupon ﬂow is received by
bond holders at the yearly rate C, that the bond is subject to unexpected default
with constant hazard rate λ, that the bond holders recover R upon expected
default and Rλ upon unexpected default. Condition 3 is the terminal condition
if the debtor is solvent. Condition 4 sets the recovery value of the bond when the
6default barrier is ﬁrst reached. Condition 5 reﬂects the fact that, as the ﬁrm’s
assets become very valuable, default can take place only in an unexpected way.
The right hand side of condition 5 is the value of the bond when only unexpected
default can occur with intensity λ.
In deriving equation 2 universal risk neutrality is assumed, but such assump-
tion does not seem restrictive. In fact expected default is driven by the dynamics
of assets value V , which can be replicated at least in principle so to make the
market complete. And we know from Harrison and Kreps (1979) that market
completeness is tantamount to the risk neutrality assumption. Moreover λ is
both the real and the risk-neutral intensity of unexpected default. In fact the
risk of unexpected default commands no premium, since such risk is assumed to
have no systematic component, unexpected default being a complete surprise.
The solution to equation 2 and to the respective conditions is
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These formulae allow to derive a closed form solution also for the value of a
credit default swap S (V,t), which pays P − Rλ in case of unexpected default
and P − R in case of expected default before time T, and which requires the
protection buyer (bondholder) to continuously pay a constant premium at the
yearly rate Cs. Then the value of one such credit default swap for the protection
buyer is
S (V,t)=S (V ) − OS (V,t) (14)
8S (V )=
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Figure 1 shows the model predicted term structure of credit spreads. The
ﬁgure shows that the advantage of allowing both expected and unexpected de-
fault to occur is that short term credit spreads are realistically high. The ﬁgure
assumes a base case with V = 100, Vb =3 0 , b =5 % , σ = 20%, r =4 % , T =1 0 ,
F =3 0 , C =5 % ·F, λ =0 .25%, Rλ =0 .5 and R =0 .5.N o t i c et h a ti fλ =0 .25%
the unexpected drop in assets value takes place every 1
λ = 400 years on average.
The ﬁgure shows that as λ increases so that unexpected default becomes
more likely, credit spreads on even high grade bonds widen. Such are the bonds
for which structural models usually predict too low short term credit spreads.
So far a ﬂat and constant term structure of default free interest rates has
been assumed. Now this assumption is relaxed.
92.1 When default free interest rates are stochastic
A closed form solutions for corporate bonds valuation is now presented when
the term structure of interest rates is stochastic and, as before, default can be
either expected or unexpected. In keeping with other structural models that
assume a stochastic default free term structure, this section assumes that debt
holders recover a fraction of the default free value of the cash ﬂows promised by
the bond ("recovery of Treasury" assumption, see e.g. Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995)).
In this section we also assume that the market in incomplete, so that the
stochastic dynamics of the ﬁrm’s assets value cannot be replicated by trading
in market securities. If follows that now the risk neutral process for V is
dV = V · (m − λV · s) · dt + V · s · dz (18)
where λV is a constant that denotes the market price of V risk. Such risk
neutral process is assumed also in Cathcart and El-Jahel (2003). Moreover, the
risk neutral process for r is now assumed to follow a generic process
dr = u(r,t)+σ(r,t)dzr
where u(r,t) and σ(r,t) are continuously diﬀeretiable functions of the short
default free interest rate r and of time t,a n dw h e r edzr is the diﬀerential of a
Wiener process. V and r are instantaneously uncorrelated, i.e. E (dV · dr)=0
or E (dz · dzr)=0 , as is assumed also in Cathcart and El-Jahel (2003). Then,
10given the "recovery of Treasury" assumption, the pricing equation for the value
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α(µ − r) − (r + λ)D(V,r,t)+λ(1 − a)Z (r,t)=0
D(V →∞ ,r,t) → Z0 (r,t) (20)
D(Vb,r,t)=( 1− a) · Z0 (r,t) (21)
D(V,r,T)=1 (22)
where Z0 (r,t) is the price of a defaultable zero coupon bond when default can
be just unexpected. In other words Z0 (r,t)=e−λ(T−t) · Z (r,t),w h e r eZ (r,t)
is the price of a default free zero coupon bond, which we can leave unspeciﬁed
for our purposes. The solution to equation 19 and to the associated boundary
conditions is
D(V,r,t)=e−λ(T−t) · Z (r,t) · H (V,t)














































































It follows that the credit spread on a zero coupon bond is




These formulae give the price of a corporate zero coupon bond, but are rel-
evant also to the valuation of a coupon bond, since a coupon bond is equivalent
to a portfolio of zero coupon bonds and can be valued accordingly. Note that in
such case coupons are assumed to be discretely paid rather than continuously
paid. This model is a special case of Cathcart and El-Jahel (2003), whereby
the default intensity λ is a constant rather than a function of the default free
short rate r. But, unlike in Cathcart and El-Jahel, here we have a closed form
solution for bond valuation. Cathcart and El-Jahel (2003) have already shown
the credit spreads predicted by this type of model.
12So far the recovery value of the bond has been exogenous to the model. Next
s u c hr e c o v e r yv a l u ei sm a d ee n d o g e n o u st ot h em o d e l .
3 The bond valuation model with endogenous
recovery
So far the recovery value of the defaulted bond has been assumed to be exoge-
nous, whereas now it is assumed to be endogenous to the model and to depend
on the ﬁrm’s assets value at the time of default, both when default is expected
and unexpected. The focus is on the bond recovery value after unexpected
default and the analysis is conﬁned to a ﬂat term structure environment. Un-
expected default may again take place with constant intensity λ, it occurs at
a random time denoted by tλ and is assumed to be associated with a sudden
drop in the value of the ﬁrm’s assets from V to V (1 − j),w i t h0 ≤ j ≤ 1.S u c h
drop at the time of unexpected default corresponds to the sudden stock price
fall one often observes at default and may be due to a reassessment of ﬁrm value
on part of investors. Asymmetric information between the ﬁrm and investors
and incomplete accounting information may cause this phenomenon as investors
suddenly re-adjust their estimates of the ﬁrm’s value after the default event.
After unexpected default, the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy only if the drop in
assets value renders the ﬁrm irreversibly insolvent. If the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy,
it incurs bankruptcy costs that are a fraction a of V (1 − j) and debt value at
tλ would be
13Rλ (V )=m i n[ V (1 − j)(1− a),P]. (29)
Since default and "cross default" debt provisions would accelerate debt maturity,
the solvency condition at tλ is
V (1 − j)(1− a) ≥ P. (30)
This condition implies that the ﬁrm cannot issue new equity to be able to pay
P.T h e ﬁrm can only liquidate the assets at a proportional cost of a or issue
new debt. But the ﬁrm cannot issue new debt with a fair value of least P if
the assets collateral value after default V (1 − j)(1− a) is less than P.T h u s ,
only if V ≥ Vλ = P
(1−j)(1−a) creditors can recover the full face value P because
the ﬁrm can reﬁnance by issuing new debt and only if V< V λ would the ﬁrm
be irreversibly insolvent after unexpected default, enter bankruptcy and incur
bankruptcy costs.
Instead, debt value after expected default is
D(Vb)=m i n( Vb (1 − a),P) (31)
and debt payoﬀ at maturity T is
D(VT,T)=m i n[ VT (1 − a),P].
Again, if VT ≤ VP = P
(1−a) the ﬁrm could not keep solvent by reﬁnancing its
14debt through liquidation of its assets or issuance of new debt. Again the ﬁrm
cannot issue new equity. Typically VP would be higher than Vb.
Employing standard valuation arguments (see e.g. Wilmott 1998 at chap-
ter 26) and assuming that the value of the ﬁr m ’ sa s s e t sf o l l o w st h ep r o c e s so f





dV 2 s2V 2 +
dD(V )
dV
(r − b + λj)V − (r + λ)D(V )+C + λRλ (V )=0
(32)
D(VT,T)=VT (1 − a) · 1VT≤VP + P · 1VT>VP (33)
D(Vb,t)=m i n( Vb (1 − a),P) (34)







This is the same model as in section one, but the recovery value after unexpected
default is now endogenous. The solution to 32 is:
D(V,t)=D(V ) − ODh (V,t) − ODl (V,t)+OP (V,t) (36)
D(V )=Dh (V ) · 1V> V P + Dl (V ) · 1V ≤VP (37)
where 1x>y is the indicator function such that, 1x>y =1if x>yand
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T−t and where Vλ = P
(1−j)(1−a).
We could reinterpret this model also as follows. At tλ assets value falls
because accounting mis-givings are detected and the true assets value becomes
known to the market. This event gives debt holders the right to accelerates
debt maturity, which does precipitate the ﬁrm’s insolvency if the ﬁrm cannot
reﬁnance by issuing new debt in order to pay P.
3.1 Comparative statics
Comparative statics using the model in this section are summarised in Table 1.
T h eb a s ec a s es c e n a r i oa s s u m e sV = 100, Vb =3 0 , b =5 % , σ = 20%, r =4 % ,
T =1 0 , F =3 0 , C =5 %· F, a = 20%, λ =0 .25%, j =0 .7.
In the base case credit spreads are very low but they short term spreads
and long term spreads are similar in magnitude. The third and fourth columns
show how the credit spreads increase as V lowers to 90 or to 80, ceteris paribus.
Notice how short term spreads do not vanish even for short maturities. The ﬁfth
and sixth columns show how the magnitude of the unexpected default intensity
λ drives the level of short term credit spreads. When λ =0 , short term spreads
vanish because unexpected default is ruled out. The two rightmost columns
show that a dramatic downwards jump in assets value is required to prevent
short term spreads form vanishing. When j =0 .5 short term spreads are much
lower than long term spreads and in fact nearly disappear despite the possibility
of unexpected default. This highlights that it is only an unexpected dramatic
fall in assets value, even if very unlikely, that can boost short term spreads, i.e.
18justify higher short term credit spreads than the spreads predicted by "classic"
structural models. In fact, creditors can recover the full face value of debt if
assets are valuable enough after unexpected default (i.e. if Vλ > P
(1−j)(1−a) ),
so that short term spreads for high credits are tend to zero despite possible
unexpected default.
We can conclude that when the bond recovery value is endogenous in that
it is a function of the ﬁrm’s assets value, unexpected default can explain real-
istically high short term credit spreads for low grade debtors, but less so for
high grade debtors. If the observed short term yield spreads on high grade
corporate bonds are compensation for credit risk, investors must gauge that un-
expected default is possible, even if it is unlikely, and that it is associated with
an exceptional drop in assets value.
3.2 Random jump in assets value and random bankruptcy
costs
The model of this section can be easily adapted if the size of the assets value
jump j is random and distributed according to a discrete probability distribu-
tion. Suppose j is distributed such that j = i with probability p(i), i is such
that 0 ≤ i ≤ n ≤ 1 and
Pn
i=0 p(i)=1 . Then, denoting with D(V,t,j∗) the
bond value when j is distributed as just described, from the concavity of Rλ (V )




p(i) · D(V,t,i) ≤ D(V,t,E(i)) (53)
19where D(V,t,i) is the bond value as per equation 36 when j is certain and
equal to i and where D(V,t,E(i)) is the bond value when j is equal to the
expected value E (i) with certainty. Note that E (i)=
Pn
i=0 i · p(i).I n a
similar way it is possible to adapt the proposed model when the bankruptcy
cost parameter a is random and the distribution for a is a discrete one.
Table 2 shows model predicted credit spreads as j is uniformly distributed




100 and p(i)= 1
101 for any i.T h e u n i f o r m
distribution corresponds to maximum uncertainty about the magnitude of the
drop in assets value. Table 2 assumes the same parameters as in Table 1 and
shows how, when j is uniformly distributed, high short term credit spreads are
possible and they are driven by the magnitude of the default intensity λ.I t
is the extreme uncertainty about j that causes credit spreads in Table 2 to be
higher than in Table 1. The ﬁfth column of Table 2 also shows that higher assets
volatility can signiﬁcantly increase credit spreads for bond maturities beyond
o n ey e a ro rs o .
Overall, the uncertainty about the magnitude of the unexpected jump in
assets value can contribute to increase the model predicted credit spreads up to
the empirically observed levels of yield spreads between corporate and Treasury
bonds.
204C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented three variants of a structural model of credit risk in
closed form, whereby both expected and unexpected defaults may take place.
Closed form solutions have been provided for corporate bonds and credit default
swaps, both when interest rates are constant and stochastic, and both when the
recovery value of the bond after default is exogenous or endogenous to the model.
With exogenous bond recovery value, the model has the merit of predicting
non negligible credit spreads even for short maturities and even for the best
credits. This is true both under constant and under stochastic interest rates and
the reason is that unexpected default increases credit spreads of all maturities.
But this is often not true of short term credit spreads with endogenous bond
recovery value.
When the bond recovery value is endogenous, unexpected default may be
associated with a sudden signiﬁcant drop in the ﬁrm’s assets value, as is sug-
gested by the sharp drop in stock price oneo f t e no b s e r v e sa tt h et i m eo fd e f a u l t .
Asymmetric information between the ﬁrm and investors and less than transpar-
ent accounting information may explain this phenomenon, as the drop in assets
value at default may correspond to a reassessment of ﬁrm value on part of in-
vestors. Such drop can render a good credit economically insolvent and cause
the ﬁrm’s assets to be insuﬃcient to fully satisfy the claim of bondholders after
default. But such drop must be exceptionally large to render a good credit insol-
vent. Overall, when recovery value is endogenous, unexpected default together
with a simultaneous sudden and potentially large drop in the ﬁrm’s assets value
21can explain why short term credit spreads should be higher than "classic" struc-
tural models of credit risk do predict. Moreover, extreme uncertainty about the
magnitude of the potential plunge in assets value contributes to boost model
predicted short term credit spreads.
High short term credit spreads seem plausible for low grade debtors, but
less so for high grade debtors. If the observed short term yield spreads for high
grade borrowers are compensation for credit risk, investors must believe there is
a tiny probability, e.g. around 0.25% per annum, of a dramatic sudden plunge
in assets value down to approximately the default barrier level.
A When interest rates are constant
The solution to equation 2 and to the respective boundary conditions is






dV 2 s2V 2 +
dOD (V,t)
dV
(r − b)V − (r + λ)OD (V,t)=0
(55)
OD (V,T)=D(V ) (56)
OD (Vb,t)=0 (57)
OD (V →∞ ,t) → e−(r+λ)(T−t)D(V ) (58)
d2D(V )
dV 2 s2V 2 +
dD(V )
dV
(r − b)V − (r + λ)D(V )+λRλ + C =0 (59)
O(Vb,t)=R (60)








dV 2 s2V 2 +
dOP (V,t)
dV




OP (V →∞ ,t) → e−(r+λ)(T−t)P (65)
The solutions to the above partial diﬀerential equations and to the respective
23boundary conditions are the formulae reported in the text. In particular the
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2s2¢2 +2( r + λ)s2
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Put D(V )=λR+C







Ito’s lemma it can be shown that
d(D(V )) = d(AV q)=n(q) · AV q · dt + AV q · qs· dz
where n(w)=( r−b)w+ 1
2w(w − 1)s2. Then it is known that the value at time
t of a claim Q(D(V ),t,V b,T) that pays D(V ) at time T if VT ≥ VbT and that
pays nothing otherwise is:


































where N (x) is the cumulative of the standard normal density with x as the






using results for valuing down-and-out barrier options (see e.g. Wilmott (1998)
at page 192), the value of a claim that pays D(V ) at time T if VT ≥ VbT and if
Vt ≥ Vb for any time t<T and that pays nothing otherwise is:
















































































25Substituting a rearranging gives the formulae for OD (V,t) in the text given
that Vb = VbT.
B When interest rates are stochastic
The derivation of proposition 2 is as follows. Assume Z0 (r,t) is the price of a
defaultable zero coupon bond whereby default can be just unexpected default.








α(µ − r) − (r + λ)Z0 (r,t)=0 (66)
Z0 (r,T)=1 (67)
Z0 (r →∞ ,t) → 0 (68)
Z0 (r → 0,t)=finite. (69)
Z0 (r,T)=e−λ(T−t) ·Z (r,t),w h e r eZ (r,t) is the value of a default free zero
coupon bond as per Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985).





dV 2 s2V 2 +
dH (V,t)
dV
(m − λx · s)V + λ(1 − a)=0 (70)
H (V →∞ ,r,t) → 1 (71)
H (Vb,t)=( 1− a) (72)
H (V,T)=1 (73)
The solution to this partial diﬀerential equations for H (V,t) is derived as
follows. First recognise that
H (V,t)=H (V ) − O(H (V ),t)+O1 (V,t) (74)
where H (V ) is such that
d2H (V,t)
dV 2 s2V 2 +
dH (V,t)
dV
(m − λx · s)V + λ(1 − a)=0 (75)
H (V →∞ ,r,t) → 1 (76)
H (Vb,t)=( 1− a) (77)
where O(H (V ),t) is the value of a claim that pays H (V ) at time T if
VT ≥ VbT and if Vt ≥ Vb for any time t<T and that pays nothing otherwise,





dV 2 s2V 2 +
dO1 (V,t)
dV
(m − λx · s)V =0 (78)
O1 (V →∞ ,r,t) → 1 (79)
O1 (Vb,t)=0 (80)
O1 (V,T)=1 (81)
O1 (V,t) is the value of a digital barrier option, whose closed form solution
is well-known and is reported in the text.




















m − λV · s − 1
2s2¢2 +2 λs2
s2 . (83)
Then, from Appendix 1 the value of a claim that pays H (V ) at time T if
VT ≥ VbT and if Vt ≥ Vb for any time t<Tand that pays nothing otherwise is:






− Q(A0V q,t,V b,V bT,T)
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with nh (qh)=( m − λV · s) · qh + 1













































and with Vb = VbT. Substitutions and re-arrangements give the formula for
O(H (V ),t) in the text.
C When debt recovery value is endogenous
The solution to equation 32 is found as follows. First recognise that
D(V,t)=D(V ) − ODh (V,t) − ODl (V,t)+OP (V,t) (84)
where
D(V )=Dh (V ) · 1V> V λ + Dl (V ) · 1V ≤Vλ (85)
and Dh (V ) and Dl (V ) are such that
29d2Dh (V )
dV 2 s2V 2 +
dDh (V )
dV
(r − b + λj)V − (r + λ)Dh (V )+λP + C =0
(86)
d2Dl (V )
dV 2 s2V 2 +
dDl (V )
dV






















Dl (Vb)=( 1− a)Vb (91)
with Vλ = P
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Then, the value of a claim that pays min(P,V (1 − a)) at time T if Vt ≥ Vb
for any time t<Tand that pays nothing otherwise is:



















































Then, the value of a claim that pays Dh (V ) at time T if VT ≥ VP and if























r+λ + Dl (Vλ,t)
´
(Vλ)
















Then, the value of a claim that pays Dl (V ) at time T if Vλ ≥ VT ≥ VP and
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Base case but λ=1%























0.1           0.06% 0.07% 0.09% 0.00% 0.37% 0.16% 0.00%
0.5           0.06% 0.07% 0.09% 0.00% 0.37% 0.16% 0.02%
1.0           0.06% 0.07% 0.09% 0.00% 0.37% 0.17% 0.04%
1.5           0.06% 0.08% 0.10% 0.01% 0.38% 0.18% 0.06%
2.0           0.06% 0.08% 0.12% 0.03% 0.40% 0.20% 0.09%
2.5           0.06% 0.09% 0.15% 0.06% 0.43% 0.23% 0.12%
3.0           0.06% 0.11% 0.19% 0.10% 0.46% 0.27% 0.16%
3.5           0.06% 0.13% 0.23% 0.14% 0.49% 0.30% 0.21%
4.0           0.06% 0.14% 0.27% 0.18% 0.53% 0.34% 0.24%
4.5           0.06% 0.16% 0.30% 0.21% 0.55% 0.37% 0.28%
5.0           0.06% 0.18% 0.33% 0.25% 0.58% 0.40% 0.31%
5.5           0.06% 0.20% 0.36% 0.27% 0.60% 0.42% 0.34%
6.0           0.06% 0.21% 0.38% 0.30% 0.62% 0.44% 0.36%
6.5           0.07% 0.22% 0.40% 0.32% 0.64% 0.46% 0.38%
7.0           0.07% 0.23% 0.42% 0.34% 0.65% 0.47% 0.40%
7.5           0.08% 0.24% 0.44% 0.36% 0.66% 0.49% 0.42%
8.0           0.08% 0.25% 0.45% 0.37% 0.67% 0.50% 0.43%
8.5           0.08% 0.26% 0.46% 0.38% 0.68% 0.51% 0.44%
9.0           0.09% 0.27% 0.47% 0.39% 0.68% 0.51% 0.45%
9.5           0.09% 0.28% 0.48% 0.40% 0.68% 0.52% 0.46%


















0.1           0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.50% 1.00%
0.5           0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.50% 1.00%
1.0           0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.34% 0.50% 1.00%
1.5           0.25% 0.25% 0.26% 0.50% 0.51% 1.01%
2.0           0.25% 0.26% 0.28% 0.67% 0.53% 1.02%
2.5           0.25% 0.27% 0.31% 0.80% 0.56% 1.05%
3.0           0.25% 0.28% 0.34% 0.89% 0.59% 1.09%
3.5           0.25% 0.30% 0.38% 0.95% 0.63% 1.12%
4.0           0.25% 0.32% 0.42% 0.99% 0.66% 1.15%
4.5           0.25% 0.34% 0.45% 1.00% 0.70% 1.18%
5.0           0.25% 0.35% 0.49% 1.01% 0.73% 1.21%
5.5           0.25% 0.37% 0.51% 1.01% 0.75% 1.23%
6.0           0.25% 0.38% 0.54% 1.01% 0.77% 1.25%
6.5           0.26% 0.39% 0.56% 1.00% 0.79% 1.27%
7.0           0.26% 0.41% 0.57% 0.99% 0.81% 1.28%
7.5           0.26% 0.42% 0.59% 0.98% 0.82% 1.29%
8.0           0.27% 0.42% 0.60% 0.97% 0.83% 1.30%
8.5           0.27% 0.43% 0.61% 0.96% 0.84% 1.30%
9.0           0.28% 0.44% 0.62% 0.95% 0.85% 1.31%
9.5           0.28% 0.44% 0.63% 0.94% 0.85% 1.31%
10.0        0.28% 0.45% 0.63% 0.93% 0.86% 1.31%
Table 2
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